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Key messages
 ` Smallholder farmers can contribute 
significantly to climate change mitigation 
but will need incentives to adapt their 
practices.
 ` Incentives from selling carbon credits are 
limited by low returns to farmers, high 
transaction costs, and the need for farmers 
to invest in mitigation activities long 
before they receive payments. 
 ` Improved food security, economic benefits 
and adaptation to climate change are 
more fundamental incentives that should 
accompany mitigation. 
 ` Designing agricultural investment and 
policy to provide up-front finance and 
longer term rewards for mitigation 
practices will help reach larger numbers 
of farmers than specialized mitigation 
interventions.
Farmers have experienced increases in maize yields 
after intercropping maize and fertilizer trees such as 
Calliandra. Photo credit: Charlie Pye-Smith
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Introduction
Farmers can significantly reduce climate change 
by selecting agricultural practices that reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions or store carbon. To 
encourage more farmers to use these practices, 
various incentives have been proposed, including 
payments for carbon credits. Yet in developing 
countries smallholder farmers’ priorities are often to 
get immediate benefits from farming and ensure 
their own food security. Climate change mitigation 
among smallholders is thus more likely to occur 
where it is a co-benefit or outcome of practices that 
farmers pursue for improved income or reduced 
risk. In many cases these practices serve multiple 
goals, including increased yields, and improved 
ecosystem and livelihood resilience.
As developing countries prepare commitments 
to mitigation activities in agriculture, investments 
should be guided by a thorough understanding of 
the appropriate incentives to encourage farmers 
to innovate and adopt new mitigation practices. 
This policy brief examines the benefits and costs 
of mitigation practices, financing opportunities, 
institutional arrangements and enabling 
conditions that could motivate mitigation.
Why incentives?
Global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions derived 
directly from agriculture amount to approximately 
5.1–6.1 Gt CO2-eq. per year (Smith et al. 2008), 
which is roughly equivalent to the transport 
sector. The majority (74 percent) of agricultural 
emissions originate in low- and middle-income 
countries, where smallholder farmers are most 
common. Mitigation efforts in agriculture, such 
as enhancing soil carbon, could potentially offset 
24 to 84 percent of current agricultural emissions 
(Smith et al. 2008). 
There is a large gap, however, between what is 
technically feasible and what farmers are willing 
or able to do. Farmers will not adopt mitigation 
practices if there are trade-offs against farm 
productivity or food security. To make mitigation 
attractive, new practices must provide tangible 
benefits and be linked to improvements in 
productivity and livelihood security, including 
adaptation to climate change (see Box 1). 
Financial and non-financial incentives that could 
help make mitigation practices more attractive 
include: (i) improved farm production, efficiency 
or adaptability to climate change; (ii) income and 
other benefits from selling offsets in the carbon 
market or payments for ecosystem services (PES) 
schemes; (iii) increased prices for sustainable, 
low climate impact products; (iv) improved 
opportunities to attract investment; and (v) better 
alignment with values and social norms. 
For example, the Kenya Agricultural Carbon 
Project is supporting farmers to improve their soil 
productivity and crop yields through agroforestry 
and other improved practices. The farmers 
increase their returns by improved planning and 
management of resources. They also expect to 
receive payments for the carbon they are helping 
to store. 
Box 1. Smallholders in mitigation and 
adaptation: Thailand case study 
(Adapted from Srang-iam 2011, in Havemann and 
Muccione, 2011)
A recent study in Thailand highlighted the 
differences in concerns between farmers and 
government mitigation schemes: farmers’ 
main concern was their ability to secure their 
livelihoods in the face of climatic uncertainty, 
while the government’s aim was to achieve 
net GHG reductions. The government 
interventions did not explicitly consider local 
resilience impacts. 
The most vulnerable farmers were most 
likely to adopt high-GHG emitting farming 
practices, yet were excluded from government 
mitigation programs, such as tree planting 
schemes, because they lacked tenure 
documents. National climate policies need to 
consider how to work with marginal farmers to 
develop low carbon adaptation strategies.
– 3 –
How much? 
Benefits
Many mitigation practices can provide food pro-
duction, economic and environmental benefits. 
Sustainable land management (SLM), as a suite of 
practices, offers the largest potential for syner-
gies between food security and mitigation. SLM 
includes reduced tillage, integrated nutrient man-
agement, improved organic residue management, 
and agroforestry or restoration of degraded lands 
(McCarthy et al. 2011). 
Other options with demonstrated mitigation 
and agricultural yield benefits include improved 
nutrient and manure management, rice cultiva-
tion using alternate wet and drying irrigation, and 
sustainable grazing management. Dry climatic 
zones generally offer lower mitigation benefits per 
hectare than humid zones because of their lower 
biomass production (Branca et al. 2011). Because 
of their extensive nature, however, their total 
 contribution is potentially large. 
Costs and financing
Assessing the costs of establishing and maintain-
ing mitigation activities can provide an indication 
of finance needs. Table 1 provides examples of the 
costs associated with different practices. The data 
show that establishment as well as maintenance 
costs can be significant for materials, labor and 
equipment such as specialized planting imple-
ments or biogas generators. Climate finance can 
help farmers overcome these costs (Box 2). 
Institutional arrangements and 
enabling conditions
Carbon markets 
Carbon markets and payments for mitigation 
services have received much attention as 
sources of finance for mitigation, but have yet 
to demonstrate that they can provide strong 
incentives. Four factors have hindered carbon 
markets in agriculture: limited markets, low 
returns to farmers, hidden costs and the need for 
Box 2. Climate finance to support smallholder 
adoption of new practices 
(Adapted from Streck et al. 2012)
A lack of investment and credit are among the most 
important barriers to the uptake of new practices by 
smallholders. Policies that address financial incentives 
for individual farmers can be divided into four types: (i) 
output and results-based payments; (ii) direct access 
to loans or other financial products; (iii) risk-sharing 
mechanisms; and (iv) incentives for enhanced private 
investment. 
Climate finance can provide support to smallholders in 
different forms, including:
 ` transition funds to reimburse costs of adoption and 
address lack of credit
 ` payments for ecosystem services related to 
sustainable agriculture, where upfront finance is not 
needed
 ` coverage of insurance and guarantee costs to reduce 
risks and encourage smallholders to invest and 
intensify production 
 ` support for capacity building and transaction costs, 
to cover costs of aggregation of smallholders, 
measurement, reporting and verification, training 
extension agents and certification costs. 
advance funding. Carbon market options are at an 
early stage of development, however, so further 
innovation and experience may help improve 
these conditions.
Limited markets
The most important general carbon trading 
mechanism has been the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). For agriculture, mitigation 
methodologies allowed under the CDM are 
limited to tree planting, management of biogas 
from animals and irrigation in rice. Smallholders 
have found the CDM extremely difficult to access 
because of its high transaction costs, the expense 
of measurements and the technical expertise 
required. 
Agricultural carbon credits for sustainable land 
management are also available in the voluntary 
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Table 1. Examples of investment and maintenance costs of sustainable land management options
Technology 
options Practices Case study
Establishment 
costs
US$/ha/year
Average 
maintenance 
costs
US$/ha/year
Agro-forestry Various argro-
forestry practices
 ` Grevillea agroforestry system, Kenya
 ` Shelterbelts, Togo
 ` Different agroforestry systems in Sumatra, 
Indonesia
 ` Intensive agroforestry system (high-input, grass 
barriers, contour ridging), Colombia
160
376
1,159
1,285
90
162
80
145
Soil and water 
conservation
Conservation 
agriculture (CA)
 ` Small-scale conservation tillage, Kenya
 ` Minimum tillage and direct planting, Ghana
 ` Medium-scale no-till technology for wheat and 
barley farming, Morocco
0
220
600
93
212
400
Improved 
agronomic 
practices
 ` Natural vegetative strips, The Philippines
 ` Grassed Fanya juu terraces, Kenya
 ` Konso bench terrace, Ethiopia
84
380
2,060
36
30
540
Integrated nutrient 
management
 ` Compost production and application, Burkina 
Faso
 ` Tassa planting pits, Niger
 ` Runoff and floodwater farming, Ethiopia
12
160
383
30
33
814
Improved 
pasture 
and grazing 
management
Improved pasture 
management
 ` Grassland restoration and conservation, 
Qinghai province, China (1)
65 12
Improved grazing 
management
 ` Rotational grazing, South Africa
 ` Grazing land improvement, Ethiopia
105
1,052
27
126
(1) Project estimates
Source: McCarthy et al. 2011: 25. Costs include labor (farmers’ own labor and paid labor), equipment and materials.
market. This market has been more nimble in 
creating arrangements suited to farmers’ needs, 
such as accounting for risk in agriculture through 
discounted credits, but it also tends to offer 
lower carbon prices. Private investors’ interest in 
agricultural carbon markets also has been low, 
limiting the scope for engaging large number 
of farmers. At current carbon prices and project 
scales, returns occur only after 10–15 years 
and are not competitive with other sectors. 
Private investment could be enhanced though 
public funding to demonstrate the feasibility of 
agricultural carbon and to support risk sharing. 
Insurance or other buffering mechanisms may 
also help reduce the risk of farmers not delivering 
promised credits. If carbon prices increased to 
US $20, $50 or even $100, as some models have 
suggested, these conditions would be likely to 
change substantially.
Without a global regulated market for agricultural 
credits and a higher carbon return, the demand 
for agricultural carbon credits remains low.
Low returns to farmers
Smallholder households in existing carbon 
projects are projected to earn only US $2 to $10 
per year at current carbon prices. While farmers 
value the new potential income, most seem to 
adopt new practices because of the prospect 
for improved yields rather than payments. One 
option to increase payments is to aggregate 
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services. Such schemes need to be adjusted to 
provide up-front investment to farmers to finance 
the adoption of best management practices, 
certified against credible standards. 
Nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions 
Nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) 
are a policy tool under discussion by the countries 
participating in the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to 
channel funding to developing countries for their 
mitigation actions (see Box 3). Local government 
should also play a role in developing Locally 
Appropriate Mitigation Actions (LAMAs), to ensure 
that proposals are sensitive to local needs and 
agroecological conditions. 
farmers, for example using Programs of Activity, 
which enable project developers to treat different 
groups of farmers using the same mitigation 
intervention as ‘one program’ and thereby reduce 
project development costs. Another option is 
to bundle mitigation with rewards for other 
ecosystem services such as biodiversity or water 
conservation. 
Hidden costs
Carbon market projects involve huge imple-
mentation costs to organize farmers and provide 
technical assistance. Because project developers 
often have previous, lengthy involvement with 
farmers, many costs have already been absorbed 
or are subsidized by donor funding and are not 
accounted for in carbon project business plans or 
figures. The cost of mitigation is therefore often 
underestimated and current projects are unlikely 
to be replicable without similar prior engagement 
and development infrastructure. 
Need for advance finance
Carbon markets may prove more viable for 
smallholders if financing can be provided 
upfront to encourage technical innovation. 
Carbon payments are usually only made once 
the carbon credits have been produced and 
verified, which means that funds are not available 
for the transition to new practices. The Plan Vivo 
program (www.planvivo.org) provides a stream of 
payments to farmers from the start of the project 
cycle for this reason. 
REDD+ and payments for 
ecosystem services
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
forest Degradation (REDD+) and payments for 
ecosystem service (PES) schemes are potentially 
new income sources for smallholders that could 
support agricultural mitigation. REDD+ aims to 
provide mechanisms under which developed 
countries pay land managers in the developing 
world to avoid deforestation and forest 
fragmentation. PES schemes similarly aim to pay 
land mangers to provide defined environmental 
Box 3. Nationally appropriate mitigation actions 
in agriculture  
(Adapted from Streck et al. 2012)
NAMAs are commitments made by developing coun-
tries to reduce GHG emissions. These are submitted to 
the UNFCCC and act as tools for securing international 
climate financing. NAMAs are expected to follow a per-
formance-based logic and to be linked to real and mea-
surable emission reductions. Where NAMAs are imple-
mented with international support, they are subject to 
both national and international measurement, reporting 
and verification (MRV). Financing and implementation 
modalities remain undefined. Regardless of the eventual 
rules for international support to NAMAs, public sector 
finance alone will not be able to fully finance low-carbon 
development in developing countries.
Two countries (Papua New Guinea and Morocco) have 
established sector-wide agricultural mitigation targets 
without specifying the actions to be taken, while some 
countries (Brazil, for example) have submitted agricultural 
reduction targets for specific actions such as no-till 
agriculture or increased use of biofuels. Other countries 
have tended to identify broad priorities for development 
of the agricultural sector or just a list of specific actions, 
such as crop residue management or the restoration of 
grasslands.
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Agricultural finance 
The widest and most enduring impacts for farmers 
are likely to occur where agricultural development 
institutions mainstream mitigation into finance 
and technical support programs. In the public sec-
tor, for example, the transition to new mitigation 
practices could be supported through new forms 
of credit, risk sharing or insurance mechanisms, 
agricultural development funds, sectoral policies, 
and local government agricultural infrastructure 
and technical facilitation. 
The private sector could provide similar transition 
finance through contractual agreements related 
to grower schemes, certification or labeling that 
specify low climate impacts, as well as credit and 
insurance schemes. Public and private sector 
cooperation may improve the quality of technical 
extension and harmonize the provision of 
technical service delivery. 
Table 2 summarizes some of the ways agricultural 
finance linked to mitigation could meet 
smallholders’ livelihood needs.
Differentiating incentives
Incentives need to be appropriate to the 
livelihoods of women and men farmers in specific 
contexts, farming systems and agro-ecosystems. 
Some farmers will always be more cost-effective 
and reliable at implementing climate change 
mitigation activities. These farmers may require 
lower levels of payment to achieve a given 
Table 2. Smallholders’ needs and how they can be met by GHG mitigation-linked benefits 
Potential revenue enhancing and risk-reducing support to address need
Primary benefits (direct)
Smallholder 
assumptions
Tangible
(Value is quantifiable)
Intangible
(Value difficult to quantify)
Little, seasonal 
and insecure 
household revenue
 ` Payment for GHG mitigation units
 ` Provide new income generating opportunities 
e.g. new produce, processing facilities, 
employment
 ` Improved earnings through provision of quality 
and consistent extension service
 ` Improved earnings by receiving more per unit 
of produce
 ` Dividends/profit share from selling product 
associated with project
 ` Clarification and improvement of tenure
 ` Improved market access
 ` Institutional development
 ` Decreasing irregularity of smallholder incomes 
e.g. by introducing new, diverse income sources 
and providing access to storage
 ` Agricultural training and techniques
High relative 
household and 
production costs
 ` Support to displace or reduce production costs 
e.g. inputs, energy
 ` Support to displace or reduce living costs
 ` Improvement of local facilities (healthcare/
schools)
High vulnerability 
to events that 
impact on 
production
 ` Provide access to facilities that can extend the 
life of products e.g. processing and storage 
facilities
 ` Provide access to formal production and family 
insurance
 ` Access to savings opportunities
 ` Improved information access (e.g. on weather)
 ` Training on nutrition and health
 ` Increased local resilience
Co-benefits (indirect)
 ` Training in financial literacy
 ` Smallholder political representation
 ` Gender awareness
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mitigation impact and may be attractive for 
targeted funding because of their efficiency. 
Reaching resource-poor farmers requires extra 
effort. Support for mitigation should be weighed 
carefully against the costs. Extension services and 
projects tend to be biased towards ‘early adopters’, 
who are generally better-off households and men. 
Overcoming this bias will require safeguards, extra 
measures and clear gender-appropriate strategies. 
Measures to reach women and the poor include 
designing projects based on the needs of target 
groups; project evaluation indicators and rules 
on participation or benefit distribution, taking 
account of land tenure and women’s rights; direct 
provision of benefits to target groups; creating 
in-kind incentives that are unlikely to be co-opted 
by others; and rigorous monitoring of project 
processes and impacts. 
Conclusion
To achieve mitigation in agriculture, a variety of 
incentives can be used to encourage farmers 
to establish and maintain new practices. While 
carbon markets are one source of finance, more 
fundamental change is likely to occur where 
farmers can see that changes in practices directly 
improve their livelihoods. This turns the question 
around: rather than seeking to change farming 
practices to minimize climate impacts, the goal 
must be to achieve food security, sustainable 
agricultural development and adaptation to 
climate change, while also minimizing emissions.
To have a significant impact, national govern-
ments can improve the conditions that help 
farmers adopt and sustain practices that reduce 
impacts on the climate. Appropriately targeted 
incentives that foster food security as well as 
adaptation to climate change, should encourage 
smallholders to implement the desired mitigation 
activities. With the right incentives these rewards 
could help transform agriculture to support small-
holders’ livelihoods, ensure food security  
and reduce agriculture’s impact on the climate 
(Figure 1).
Mainstreaming mitigation incentives in the 
programs and institutions that deliver agricultural 
development is essential to produce enduring 
outcomes at large scales. It should also 
allow donors to see the added value of their 
interventions more readily. Mitigation incentives 
are thus best built into more comprehensive 
agricultural strategies that support enhanced 
productivity and food security with practices that 
also contribute to mitigation and adaptation to 
climate change.
Figure 1. Incentives for mitigation
Credit, insurance, aid, 
technical assistance
Rewards for 
mitigation
 ` Improved 
yield, income, 
livelihood
 ` Premium price for 
green product
 ` Values, social 
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 ` Adaptation to 
climate change
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carbon credits
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